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Green-Collar Politics: Perils and Opportunities for South Korea                                  
in the Green-Tech Race
By Damien Ma and Will Pearson
According to the United Nations Environment Program, 
global investment in clean energy totaled $162 billion in 
2009.1 Thanks in large part to renewable energy mandates 
in the EU and in many U.S. states—as well as in response 
to successful incentive programs in large markets such as 
China—renewable energy constituted just over 35 percent 
of all new power capacity additions worldwide in 2009 
(Figure 1). Costs for renewable energy continue to fall as 
technologies and supply chains become more efficient and 
capable of meeting global demand. 
Although growth has been impressive and the long-term out-
look promising, clean energy’s emergence remains vulnerable 
to volatile policy risks. The lack of global agreement on how 
to price environmental externalities, most prominently carbon, 
into energy markets represents a significant and persistent risk 
to clean-technology industries. And with many market observ-
ers predicting a decade-long natural gas supply glut, which will 
suppress prices, demand for clean energy will remain almost 
completely dependent on government support. But, owing to 
the sluggish state of the global economic recovery, rising legacy 
costs for renewable energy subsidies, and an increased inci-
dence of clean-technology trade disputes, this political backing 
for renewable energy has shown some signs of exhaustion. A 
continuation of this trend could derail some deployment targets 
while disrupting export-driven growth models in others.
Washington remains the focal point for the future of climate 
policy. A confluence of economic and political factors stalled 
U.S. climate policy in 2009 and 2010, eviscerating hopes of 
reaching a meaningful and binding accord at Copenhagen. With 
the Democratic Party having suffered a decisive setback in the 
midterm elections of November 2010, hopes for U.S. climate 
legislation are dim through 2012. Consequently, expectations 
for the Cancun round of climate talks were downgraded, and 
any chance for a more meaningful international agreement will 
be punted until the summit in South Africa next year.
So, while deployment of clean energy continues to grow, several 
factors are putting such government support mechanisms at 
risk. The global slowdown has made it more difficult to extend 
the high costs currently associated with renewables to ratepay-
ers, especially residential consumers of electricity. Introducing 
demand-side incentives such as feed-in tariffs (FiTs) or renew-
able energy standards raises energy costs, and they can become 
a political liability. To counter this, governments have linked 
demand-side mandates to a range of preferential policies on the 
supply side that promise “green-collar” job creation and long-
Governments worldwide have made the development of 
clean-energy technology and manufacturing capability a 
strategic priority. Broad political backing for renewables 
industries is often erected not primarily because of the envi-
ronmental and energy supply diversification characteristics 
of renewable energy; instead, support is buttressed more 
by the potential for clean technologies to generate jobs and 
provide a sustainable driver for economic growth. 
Source: EIA, IEA, New Energy Finance
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term economic competitiveness. The subsidies that promote 
job creation and competitiveness may breach trade laws, and 
legal cases now emerging could add another headwind to 
the sector. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 
fired off a shot recently by deciding to investigate United 
Steelworkers’ (USW) petition against China’s policies in the 
clean-energy sector. A U.S. decision to take a substantive 
case to the World Trade Organization (WTO) could herald 
a new era of political tensions surrounding the industry.
Even if the trade case does not blossom into a serious threat 
to the industry, it does send a warning to governments around 
the world that designing appropriate support mechanisms 
for the renewable energy sector may be necessary lest it 
becomes mired in trade spats. Despite the myriad challenges 
the sector faces, governments from the United States to 
China are not yet prepared to reverse or eliminate policy 
support for the production and use of renewable energy. 
But that political support remains tenuous and is contingent 
upon the global economic environment and policy evolution 
in individual countries.
This paper examines policies in the renewables sector across 
various countries and where political tensions could gener-
ate suboptimal outcomes for the sector’s development. In 
its analysis of supply- and demand-side strategies of the 
clean-energy sector, this paper will also highlight some of the 
perils facing Seoul—and the lessons Korea can glean from 
other countries’ efforts to prevent “renewables fatigue”—
as it places greater emphasis on supporting clean-energy 
industries.
Renewable Energy Development across Countries
Renewable energy policies in countries worldwide provide 
a glimpse of the challenges ahead for South Korea as clean-
energy manufacturing capacity and consumption expand. 
For the most part, government-backed demand incentives 
such as FiTs and renewables portfolio standards are two of 
the most commonly employed policies to promote renew-
able energy deployment. On the supply side, grants, tax 
incentives, and preferential lending practices characterize 
government support for the production of renewable energy 
technologies.
The extent and scope of state support differ across and within 
countries. Several European countries emerged as early 
movers in promoting the supply and demand of clean energy, 
and EU policies have reinforced member-state programs. As 
a result, many leading clean-energy companies are based in 
Europe. Yet, as the EU is mired in a protracted battle for 
economic recovery and over severe budget deficits, some 
signs of backsliding on renewable energy support have ap-
peared, primarily targeting solar photovoltaics (PV).
In Asia, numerous countries are determined to cultivate a 
globally competitive clean-energy industry. In addition to 
South Korea, China and Japan have embarked on a set of 
industrial policies that seek to expand market share and vie 
for technology leadership, igniting an intense competition 
among the players that has only just begun. Unlike the existing 
“integrated Asian production” model—where China largely 
serves as the final assembly destination for a product with 
higher value-added parts that are imported from Japan, South 
Korea, and elsewhere—Beijing does not appear willing to play 
that role much longer, particularly in clean energy. China, too, 
wants to create an integrated, high-value supply chain within 
the country.
The United States, although endowed with immense innovative 
capacity, technological prowess, and private capital, has suffered 
from the lack of a coherent national energy policy and effec-
tive legislation that clearly creates incentives for renewables 
development. However, federal-level inaction has not prevented 
individual states from implementing policies to catalyze clean-
energy industries.
Europe 
Through a combination of favorable demand-side policies and 
incentives and first-mover advantage, the EU emerged as the 
global leader in clean technology. Germany, Spain, and Denmark 
house some of the world’s leading wind and solar firms (Figure 
2). This is a clear testament to the impact that European renew-
able energy policies, rather than climate policy per se, have had 
on the sector’s growth. 
Figure 2. Installed Wind Capacity by Country, 2009
Source: World Wind Energy Association, "World Wind Energy Report 2009" 
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Effect of government policies. Two policies have mattered 
greatly in spurring demand for renewables. One is EU’s man-
date that 20 percent of energy supply must come from renew-
able resources by 2020, a Brussels directive that established 
individual renewable energy plans for each member country.2 
The other is the introduction on the member-state level of 
FiTs that guarantee a set price for the purchase of electricity 
generated from renewables. Government incentives such as 
tax deductions and preferential lending or renewable energy 
investments have also played a major role in cementing the 
EU’s front-runner status.
Although the considerable policy drivers have resulted in the 
creation of a slate of venerable EU-based renewable energy 
companies, the path has not been without pitfalls. In fact, 
the European case offers numerous lessons about the politi-
cal and economic costs associated with forging a leadership 
position in the renewables sector.
Driven in part by falling technology costs—a long-term ne-
cessity for the market—governments across the EU slashed 
solar PV FiTs in 2010. Europe’s solar PV FiTs were designed 
to be cut gradually, but they did not keep pace with falling 
costs of production. This resulted in higher profit margins 
for investors and several overheated solar PV markets. Yet 
technology improvements are only part of the story. As FiTs 
are cut and investment margins trimmed, European firms 
are losing out to lower-cost manufacturers in Asia, namely 
China. At a time when European governments are intent on 
reviving their economies after the financial crisis, political 
and popular will to subsidize higher-cost PV power with 
imported solar panels is waning.
The following accounts of the German and Spanish responses 
to the rising costs of renewable energy deployment programs 
provide a snapshot of the cost implications of focusing on 
offshore wind and solar power on the demand side. In ad-
dition, the sharp cuts in incentives for solar PV power are 
an ominous sign for export-driven growth models in the 
clean-energy sector.
Two cautionary tales on cost: Germany and Spain. Among 
the EU member countries cutting PV FiTs in 2010, Germany 
was the most significant. In light of estimates that Germany’s 
FiTs would cost taxpayers a total of €50–€75 billion (around 
$65–$100 billion) over 25 years, Germany’s parliament on 9 
June 2010 voted to reduce the FiTs. The German government 
estimates that 9.5 gigawatts (GW) of new solar capacity will 
come online in 2010—nearly tripling the previous record 
for annual installed capacity. As a result, according to an 
announcement by Germany’s Federal Network Agency on 
15 October 2010, domestic electricity prices will rise by 10 
percent in 2011.3
Moreover, the trade dimension to the German price hike 
could further test public support. Over half of the 9.5 GW 
expected to be installed in 2010 will be powered by lower-
cost solar panels imported from China. Indeed, the German 
Ministry of Economics and Technology  indicates that more 
than 75 percent of solar capacity will come from imports. Ger-
many will subsequently pay over €13 billion ($18 billion) for 
renewable energy next year, with much of the money flowing 
indirectly from ratepayers to foreign firms. The higher cost of 
solar alone would be enough to shake solar support, but the 
added element of rising import reliance has further dampened 
enthusiasm for the sector.
Germany’s new Energy Concept, issued in September 2010, 
indicates a transition to more extensive support for offshore 
wind as part of an intensified drive to increase the share of re-
newables to 35 percent of total power generation by 2020, up 
from 17 percent now.4 Offshore wind is another expensive re-
newable energy resource, indicating that further price increases 
are forthcoming. For the first time, German consumer groups 
are raising concerns over the price tag for renewable energy 
resources. Any sign of consumer backlash in Germany would 
send a very negative signal for rising costs elsewhere, as few 
countries can boast the kind of domestic clean-energy industry 
that Germany can.
Another early mover in renewable energy, Spain has emerged 
as a leading market for wind and solar technologies and touts a 
roster of multinational giants such as Iberdrola, Acciona, Aben-
goa, and Gamesa. In 2008, however, the Spanish government 
demonstrated the perils of imposing FiTs on the renewables mar-
ket. After introducing an overly generous solar FiT that caused the 
market to overheat, the government sharply curbed incentives.5
The tariff issue remains problematic for Spain. As the govern-
ment grapples with its debt crisis, there is concern about the 
sustainability of subsidizing more costly renewable energy 
technologies. Renewable energy power generators in Spain will 
receive more than €6 billion ($8.4 billion) in 2010 and, under 
the existing subsidy scheme, are scheduled to receive nearly 
€125 billion ($174 billion) through 2025. The government 
recently pulled back from a threat to institute a retroactive 30 
percent reduction in payments for existing solar PV projects 
but, nonetheless, has reduced by 14 percent its projections for 
solar power deployment in the country’s June 2010 renewable 
energy plan.6
Japan
Along with the EU, Japan was an early clean-tech mover. On the 
demand side, Japan promotes the consumption of renewables 
via European-style FiTs, although government support has not 
been as consistent. On the supply side, development of renew-
able energy resources has benefited from strong state support 
and continues to be led by major integrated manufacturers.
Japan has established aggressive greenhouse gas reduction 
targets during the past two years. The “low-carbon revolution” 
proposed in April 2009 was aimed at supporting economic 
growth and addressing climate change challenges by promot-
ing solar power and electric cars. In September 2009, former 
prime minister Yukio Hatoyama announced a target of reducing 
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Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent below 1990 
levels by 2020—a target reaffirmed by the current prime 
minister, Naoto Kan.
In December 2008, the Japanese government announced a 
$486 billion stimulus package that included a small allocation 
for green investment. A second stimulus package of $154 
billion announced in April 2009 made a more significant 
investment in climate-related projects, funneling $23.6 bil-
lion to clean technology.
Although Japanese firms benefit from a well-oiled industrial 
policy machine, they are mostly dependent on export markets 
and highly sensitive to market barriers that discourage foreign 
imports. As an example of this sensitivity, Japan is currently 
mounting a WTO challenge against the Canadian province of 
Ontario for its preferential renewable energy policies.
United States
Unlike in Europe and Japan, development of the renewable 
energy sector in the United States has lacked a clear policy 
direction, depending instead on a combination of state pro-
grams and federal financing support mechanisms. President 
Barack Obama entered office promising to jump-start a tran-
sition to a clean-energy economy. He pledged to introduce a 
series of headline policies, including a climate change bill, a 
federal renewable energy standard (RES), and the creation 
of a green energy bank. Although early efforts to establish 
these policies stalled, green components of the 2009 federal 
stimulus package helped bolster the renewable energy sector 
during the so-called Great Recession.7 The U.S. renewables 
market continues to grow, but it is vulnerable to political 
risk at both the federal and state levels. Given the outcome 
of the midterm elections, federal support for renewables 
will likely be limited over the next two years. Further, if the 
recent USW case against China means that the United States 
is becoming a leading instigator of clean-tech trade spats, 
retaliatory filings may eventually undermine the country’s 
efforts to promote its own clean-tech industries. In sum, the 
United States presents several risks to foreign firms hoping 
to capitalize on the sheer size of its market.
Federal programs. A Republican-led House of Representa-
tives under John Boehner (R-Ohio) will not be supportive 
of climate and clean-energy policies as it was under outgo-
ing Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). A split Congress will 
struggle to implement headline energy policies like a fed-
eral RES or the Clean Energy Deployment Administration 
without putting substantially more support behind nuclear 
energy. Even in the event that a federal RES does not ma-
terialize, federal funding mechanisms will continue to be 
instrumental in financing renewable energy projects in the 
United States.
One of the most prominent stimulus package programs was 
the 1603 grant in lieu of tax credits scheme, which catalyzed 
the construction of renewable energy programs—in the 
wind industry, in particular. The program has proved to be 
extremely controversial, however, and it may be allowed to ex-
pire at the end of the year.8 Even though hundreds of renewable 
energy projects broke ground under the program, controversy 
emerged over the fact that a large portion of the funds went 
to foreign companies. Most of the money flowed to European 
firms, but opposition from Congress spiked after the Chinese 
firm, A-Power, announced in October 2009 that it intended to 
develop a project in Texas using government grants. As a result, 
Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) called on the Department 
of Energy to ban stimulus dollars from funding projects that 
used foreign-manufactured projects. Although Schumer failed 
to attract significant support for his “Buy American” clean-
tech proposal, he was successful in effectively establishing a 
domestic-content requirement for the A-Power project. Inciden-
tally, such content requirements were one type of trade barrier 
that the USW highlighted in its case against China (see more 
details in the final section).
Another major component of the federal stimulus package was 
the 48c manufacturing tax credit—a $2.3 billion program for 
clean-tech facilities based in the United States. The Obama 
administration explicitly stated that this program, which in ef-
fect provides a 30 percent subsidy to clean-tech manufacturing 
facilities, is intended to increase the competitiveness of U.S. 
companies in overseas markets.9 Trade lawyers have stated that, 
if the receivers of the tax credit subsequently attempt to export 
the facilities’ products, the U.S. companies would be exposed to 
a countervailing duty under WTO law since the administration 
has touted this preferential policy so publicly.10
State policies drive demand. State-level renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS) programs have been implemented in 29 states 
and the District of Columbia.11 But large variations exist in the 
percentage of renewables the mandate imposes on utilities and 
in the cost of the alternative compliance penalty payments levied 
on utilities that fail to reach their targets. Overall, state programs 
have been successful at providing positive market signals where 
the federal government has failed. But policies on the state level 
will continue to be exposed to extreme policy shifts, especially 
as governments grapple with fiscal deficits.
China
China rivals the United States in clean-energy potential, but 
Beijing’s efforts to become a leading manufacturer of clean-
energy technologies have far surpassed those in Washington. 
As a result, Chinese firms are taking an increasing piece of 
global market share, particularly for solar PV panels (Table 
1). For South Korea, China will be the obvious and formidable 
competitor in clean energy.
China’s plans for the coming decade. Beijing is determined 
that the sector’s development will play a leading role in China’s 
energy strategy in the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) that begins 
next year and ends in 2015.12 But China’s energy-related tar-
gets are primarily focused on 2020, indicating a decade-long 
push to expand an indigenous renewable energy industry that 
is competitive globally.
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To meet these ambitious targets, the Chinese government 
must introduce a host of demand-side incentives to signifi-
cantly increase consumption of renewable energy and reduce 
the share of coal in the energy mix. These targets speak to 
Chinese policymakers’ recognition of the central problem 
that has characterized the development of the renewables 
sector: the mismatch between supply and domestic demand. 
Two major and interrelated factors pose barriers to domestic 
consumption of renewable energy. One is an acutely price-
sensitive public in a relatively poor country where tolerance 
for high energy costs is low, making it a politically sensitive 
issue. The other is the existence of a dominant coal industry 
with abundant resources that can generate power at a much 
lower cost than renewables.
A brief illustration of the wind sector is instructive in under-
standing the undesired consequence of “sprinting ahead of 
demand.” China’s wind turbine industry now faces overca-
pacity after several years of doubling year-on-year growth 
in installed capacity. At the end of 2009, China already had 
some 25 GW of installed wind power—more than double 
the 10 GW originally planned for 2010—because of lower-
than-expected labor and equipment costs and attractive FiTs 
for onshore wind. By 2020, China aims to have at least 100 
GW of installed capacity although most expect China to 
overshoot that target.13
The installation of turbines has outpaced grid interconnec-
tions, however, a problem experienced in many markets 
attempting to increase wind power market penetration. 
Although estimates vary, the China Electricity Council 
reckoned that in 2009 only about two-thirds of installed ca-
pacity was being used for power generation. China’s ability 
to drastically increase the consumption of wind power will 
ultimately depend on the expansion of the transmission and 
distribution system during the next five years.14 Additional 
power pricing reforms that allow more pass-through of the 
cost for both wind energy and transmission upgrades to end 
users will therefore be critical to encouraging renewable energy 
consumption. Beijing’s willingness to impose more stringent 
resource-based taxes on traditional energy sources such as coal 
and oil will also have a positive impact on renewable energy 
development and usage.15
Given that the growth of the domestic market will be determined 
in part by midstream investments, China’s wind turbine manu-
facturers are beginning to focus more on the export market, 
especially given overcapacity issues in the home market. But 
Chinese turbines are still viewed as lower quality than their in-
ternational competitors, and China continues to seek innovation 
externally. Exporting turbines may also prove difficult because 
many foreign markets—particularly U.S. markets—are acutely 
opposed to Chinese renewables exports.
The Chinese solar sector faces a different set of problems. In 
an industry where some 90 percent of PV panels are exported, 
Chinese solar manufacturers are exposed to policy risks in im-
porter countries and the contraction of global demand in general. 
Export dependency is due to Beijing’s reluctance to introduce 
demand incentives that would encourage domestic installation 
of solar power. Until a system of FiTs is introduced, China will 
continue to take advantage of its cost advantage to export its 
solar products.
As the latest USW case filing attests, however, Chinese solar 
producers’ export strategy could face rising trade barriers that 
curtail exports. While Beijing will fight these types of cases at 
the WTO to defend its strategic clean-tech sectors, Beijing may 
be forced to finally introduce demand-side policy via favorable 
solar FiTs if the U.S. case turns out to be substantive.
Technology, innovation, and jobs. Underlying the flurry of 
targets is Beijing’s belief that renewable and sustainable energy 
technologies should be a strategic new growth area and a major 
driver of its so-called indigenous innovation push. In a recent 
complementary policy to the 12th FYP, China identified seven 
Table 1: Top 10 Manufacturers of Photovoltaics, 2005 and 2010 
2005 2010 
Company Country MW Company Country MW 
Sharp Electronics Japan 375 First Solar United States 1,322 
Kyocera Japan 142 Suntech China 1,090 
Q-Cells Germany 131 Q-Cells Germany 1,000 
Schott Solar Germany 95 JA Solar China 800 
BP Solar United States 86 SolarWorld Germany 710 
Mitsubishi Electric Japan 85 Sharp Electronics Japan 695 
Sanyo Japan 84 Trina Solar China 600 
Shell Solar United States 55 Yingli China 600 
Motech Taiwan 45 Gintech Taiwan 600 
Isofoton Spain 39 Kyocera Japan 440 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. 
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“emerging strategic industries” that will receive state backing: 
clean energy is one of those industries.16 Moreover, China is 
expected to officially incorporate an investment package of 
as much as $740 billion (recent rumors suggest a doubling of 
the amount to $1.5 trillion, akin to a “green” stimulus), from 
both the public and private sectors, to be spent during the next 
decade, likely coinciding with a new energy development 
plan that will span the same time frame.17
All is not rosy for China’s renewable energy sector, however. 
And the much-hyped rise to dominance in industries such as 
wind and solar may prove to be overstated and short-lived. 
For one, the state-led model of innovation could face dimin-
ishing returns as the private sector is squeezed out by larger 
and more powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such 
dynamics may already be emerging in the electric-vehicle 
sector as powerful SOEs recently forged an “alliance” to 
develop standards and deploy electric-vehicle technologies.18 
This has led some to refer to the alliance as a “technology 
cartel” intended to squeeze out private-sector players.
In addition, China is expected to derive 15 percent of its 
primary energy consumption from nonfossil fuels rather 
than renewables specifically. This indicates that in China 
there are strong advocates of hydro and nuclear, both of 
which will see substantial expansion over the next five 
years. Nuclear capacity alone is expected to triple in the 
12th FYP.19 Some industrial bureaucrats seem to feel that the 
15 percent target cannot be realistically reached by relying 
so heavily on renewables; hence, they back nuclear, natural 
gas, and hydro.
South Korea
Until recently, South Korea has been a relatively small player 
in the global clean-technology market. The country’s record 
on energy intensity and overall clean-technology manufac-
turing sales placed South Korea at a low ranking compared 
with others. During the past two years, however, Seoul has 
taken significant steps to advance green industrial policies 
that could place the country on a path toward being a leader in 
clean-technology manufacturing. The government is pushing 
South Korea in several research-and-development (R&D) 
areas, including solar PV, high-efficiency fuel cells, hybrid 
electric cars, smart grids, LED lights, and offshore wind.
South Korea’s policy signals were clearly articulated with a 
broad vision of becoming a world leader in clean technology. 
South Korean government officials have been promoting the 
notion of a “Green New Deal” since 2008, when President 
Lee Myung-bak announced his Green Growth Plan.20 Since 
then, a series of government programs have added govern-
ment funding for the clean-technology sector.21
In 2010, the government-led foray into renewable energy 
continued. In March, South Korea passed an RPS, requir-
ing that utilities generate 4 percent of their electricity from 
renewable sources by 2015, 10 percent by 2022, and 11 per-
cent by 2030. And in October, Seoul unveiled an ambitious $36 
billion plan aimed at making South Korea a leading exporter of 
wind and solar technologies. Like many other nations promot-
ing renewable energy, South Korea has linked the investment to 
economic growth, with authorities pledging to create 110,000 
green jobs through the plan. During the next five years, the 
government envisions grabbing 15 percent of the global wind 
and solar market. But clean-technology exports, particularly 
for solar PV, face headwinds from increasingly protectionist 
policies and possibly more legal challenges against subsidized 
clean-technology programs. To that end, Seoul will consider 
augmenting domestic demand-side incentives for renewable 
energy, as it did on 1 November 2010, when the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy announced a domestic deployment target 
for 2.5 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2019.
Looming Challenges for South Korea’s Clean-
Energy Sector
South Korean intentions to emerge as a leader on the supply and 
demand sides of the clean-technology sector will have several 
implications. On the supply side, companies worldwide will 
closely observe the country’s trajectory, given the rise of South 
Korea’s state-backed nuclear industry in the past two years that 
has proven to be globally competitive. However, there are signs 
that governments will place greater emphasis on domestic job 
growth, which could disrupt export-driven growth models for 
sectors like solar. On the demand side, rising costs associated 
with renewable energy could diminish government willingness 
to continue providing consumption incentives. This pattern 
could certainly extend to South Korea as deployment of more 
expensive solar and offshore wind takes off. Exports of these 
technologies could face further constraints if other countries 
cut incentive programs.
This concluding section highlights three areas that could derail 
renewable energy growth in the years to come: the trend toward 
trade conflicts emanating from protectionist renewable energy 
policies, cost-driven backlash to renewable energy incentives, 
and policy volatility risks to investors.
Protectionism on the Rise
Renewable energy has been identified as a strategic growth 
industry in many countries, and the industry has been tapped by 
several governments as an engine for jobs growth that can help 
economies emerge from the global economic crisis. Increasingly, 
countries are instituting preferential subsidies to encourage 
domestic manufacturing capacity for renewable energy while 
also raising the criteria for foreign entry into domestic markets. 
The fallout from more protectionist policies that are deemed to 
cause “serious prejudice” against other WTO members could 
include a rise in trade cases related to clean-technology subsidy 
programs.22
On 15 October 2010, the USTR acknowledged that it will initi-
ate a 90-day investigation of the 301 petition filed by the USW 
in September, a decision motivated by the midterm elections. 
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The Chinese government responded in expected fashion by 
claiming that if the U.S. case moves forward it will consider 
a reciprocal case against the U.S. government for its clean-
energy subsidies. Those subsidies, many of which were in 
the U.S. $787 billion stimulus package, are designed to 
encourage domestic manufacturing in the sector and create 
green-collar jobs. The case could be an isolated U.S.-China 
trade issue or it could be the start of global scrutiny on green 
tech subsidization, which could have negative cost implica-
tions for renewable energy.
So far, it is uncertain whether all the far-ranging charges 
in the USW petition hold legal water and whether the Chi-
nese subsidies highlighted are in fact WTO noncompliant. 
Whether or not the USTR takes up this petition in its entirety, 
the potential for clean-energy trade disputes is clearly present. 
Some potential scenarios that could materialize include:
Flash in the pan. Following the USTR announcement, a 
settlement between the United States and China could be 
reached either before or during the WTO consultation stage. 
In this case, the administration could hold another round 
of talks with Beijing, similar to President Obama’s visit in 
November 2009, and announce another series of nonbind-
ing clean-technology cooperation agreements, using this 
“progress” to stand down on the threats of a WTO case. Other 
countries also avoid resorting to WTO action as domestic 
industrial capacity is nurtured. Although USW and other la-
bor organizations would be disappointed in such an outcome, 
firms with global ambitions would prefer this outcome.
Prolonged bilateral issue with no clear resolution. The 
USW issued five areas of WTO violations in its petition. 
Some of these charges, such as those on domestic-content 
requirements and export subsidies as well as subsidies to 
manufacturers of clean-energy manufacturing, have sub-
stance and are likely actionable under WTO law. But the 
United States is highly exposed on the issue. For one, the 
aforementioned 48c manufacturing tax credit for clean-tech-
nology facilities based in the United States could expose any 
of the U.S. companies that received the tax credit to possible 
countervailing duties under WTO law since the government 
has been so public with this preferential policy. China’s case 
could be made easier should the 48c program be extended 
before the end of the year, as some in Congress are pushing 
for with USW support.
Tip of the iceberg. In this scenario, the USW case would 
proceed and be followed by a flood of other clean-technology 
trade cases worldwide. As a result of additional trade con-
flicts, governments could either pull back from support of 
the renewables sector or seek to change existing international 
laws pertaining to clean-tech subsidies.23
To reiterate, nearly every country engaged in promoting 
clean-energy industries has linked demand-side mandates to 
job creation. The preferential policies that help create these 
jobs could expose governments that espouse them to WTO 
challenges. Indeed, the U.S. biodiesel sector has already been 
the target of dumping charges from the EU and Australia.
Beyond the United States, more renewable energy supplier coun-
tries could seize upon recent programs to promote indigenous 
renewable energy industries. Japan’s challenge of the Canadian 
province of Ontario for its domestic-content requirements as 
part of renewable energy mandates underscores the widespread 
adoption of preferential policies, the focus on job creation, and 
the exposure to legal challenges. The Canadian government was 
also being pressured by the Europeans to drop the domestic-
content requirements in the current rounds of trade negotiations 
that took place in Canada in October. In the negotiations, Cana-
dian officials told their European counterparts that the country 
has no intention of altering the requirements. Ironically, the 
Ontario Power Authority has already run into problems with the 
domestic-content requirements and has delayed implementation, 
most likely because the local manufacturing capacity cannot 
meet the new demand.
Renewables Incentives Backlash
Regardless of whether renewable energy equipment is imported, 
manufactured, or domestic, the subsidy costs borne by electricity 
ratepayers in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors 
must eventually be eliminated to maintain public support. While 
a carbon price will be necessary, at least in the near to medium 
term, technology costs must also continue to fall. As FiTs and 
other subsidies are reduced, competition will grow fierce as 
margins are squeezed, likely leading to consolidation across 
the sector. Compounding the problem are low natural gas prices 
caused by the global supply glut. Renewable energy incentive 
programs are designed to be phased down and eventually elimi-
nated, based on the assumption that prices for fossil fuels and 
carbon will continue to rise.But if cheap gas prevents renew-
ables from reaching grid parity, then governments will need to 
maintain incentive programs for longer than expected. As legacy 
costs rise, popular and political support could disintegrate.
In addition, higher-cost renewable energy resources, such as 
solar PV and offshore wind, will add further costs to incentive 
programs. For solar, declining cost competitiveness of Western 
solar firms compared with Chinese firms will likely weaken 
government support. Already, the German and Spanish govern-
ments have indicated a frustration with the high cost of solar 
power despite boasting of leading indigenous renewable energy 
industries. Elsewhere in Europe and further afield, the high price 
tags associated with renewables will prove more problematic 
in coming years as most other countries lack manufacturing 
capability and the economic upside that comes along with it. 
As customers become exposed to steeper electricity prices, 
government support for renewable energy, and particularly solar 
PV, will be tested.
Policy Volatility an Ongoing Risk
The absence of a strong carbon price in energy markets rel-
egates promoting renewable energy to a patchwork system of 
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mandates and subsidies. Changes in political leadership or 
an exhaustion of political will in the face of various industry 
headwinds could drastically change the investment outlook 
for renewables in any of the leading global markets.
Few sectors are as dependent on state support as renew-
able energy, and developments in Spain underline growing 
concerns about the optimal way to encourage and sustain 
investment. Investors have traditionally preferred FiTs, 
which guarantee a set payment for an extended period of 
time. Because of improving technologies and volatile market 
conditions, however, it is difficult to set optimal FiTs. In some 
cases, governments have been drastically wrong, resulting in 
either underinvestment or, in the case of Spain’s PV market, 
an overheated domestic market because of overly generous 
subsidies. While retroactive changes to renewable energy 
contracts may or may not be unique to Spain, the Spanish 
case underscores the heightened level of political risk in the 
renewables sector globally.
Alternative Schemes Wanted
Wary of following a Spanish model that causes overheat-
ing of domestic markets, governments are considering 
the reverse-auction method. Such a financing structure is 
intended to more closely align renewable energy subsidies 
with the true costs of power generation, which could help 
sustain popular support. Under a reverse-auction program, 
the project developers, who in theory should have a clearer 
sense of project costs, establish prices for renewable energy. 
Last year, Brazil held what was widely considered a success-
ful reverse auction, resulting in 71 new contracts to build 1.8 
GW of wind power plants. The California Public Utilities 
Commission is set to introduce a reverse-auction model for 
solar PV facilities with a capacity of 1 to 20 megawatts. India 
and China are also seeking to develop reverse auctions for 
solar programs.
Although the reverse-auction method appears logical, the 
system is not foolproof. One problem in countries where 
tender-offer systems have not worked is that bidding com-
panies have often underestimated costs and subsequently 
were unable to complete the project. In the future, more 
sophisticated financial evaluation of project bids may al-
leviate this problem.
Conclusion: Seoul-Searching on Renewable 
Energy Policy
As various countries’ experiences so far attest, there is no sil-
ver bullet in ensuring the sustainability of a renewable energy 
industry. For South Korea, hedging against the looming risks 
detailed above, as well as relying on policy flexibility, will be 
important in preventing huge disruptions in the clean-energy 
sector. A few potential lessons may be instructive in guiding 
the formulation of policy going forward.
Overly aggressive demand-side incentives could eventually 1. 
become fiscal liabilities (as in Spain and Germany, for ex-
ample) that undermine the economic logic behind pushing 
renewable energy. In the current economic environment, 
a more gradual but progressive approach to demand-side 
incentives might be more palatable and help conserve 
political capital.
Viewing the clean-technology industry primarily through 2. 
the prism of jobs risks triggering mutually reinforcing 
protectionist barriers in markets worldwide (the USW case, 
for example), which would ultimately have the effect of 
raising costs for renewable energy. The focus should be on 
lowering technology costs and deploying on a commercial 
scale, which would establish a country’s leadership position 
in the industry and naturally create jobs.
China has a national strategic plan for clean energy, but it 3. 
faces a slew of problems like fragmented industry, overreli-
ance on the state, and limited innovation. The United States 
relies more on a Silicon Valley model for clean energy, but 
its lack of a national-level focus has resulted in a meek 
government and considerable political risk surrounding 
the change of administrations. Therefore, establishing a 
national strategic plan that is immune to political changes 
(credible and enduring political support in the absence of 
a climate change regime), coupled with extensive partici-
pation by the private sector in financing and R&D, might 
prove a good combination in the near term.
An export-led strategy will be exposed to a high degree of 4. 
political risk (as in China, for example). A balance must 
be struck between creating domestic demand for renew-
able energy and building an industry that can contribute 
to economic growth. Even though clean-technology mar-
kets are often highly politicized, investment in physical 
manufacturing plants in developed markets like the U.S. 
market will help diffuse trade concerns, while many other 
growth markets will remain open to imports. A diversified 
approach to clean-tech manufacturing, with an underlying 
emphasis on quality and cost, will hedge against protection-
ist impulses abroad and also help to ensure longer-term 
competitiveness.
Like many other countries worldwide, South Korea is seeking 
to diversify energy resources and respond to air- and water-
quality degradation resulting from years of unchecked industrial 
practices. Political threats to the industry come from a variety 
of sources—such as a lack of agreement on pricing emissions 
costs into energy markets, government-led market overheating 
via the introduction of overly attractive demand-side incen-
tives, or protectionist impulses for clean-technology industries 
during episodes of sluggish economic growth. Each of these 
issues poses significant risks to market growth during the next 
decade, but they are unlikely to derail the strategic importance 
of clean-energy technologies. As a result, the ostensible dura-
bility of market growth in the years to come will likely reward 
near-term investment of capital—both real and political—in 
the industry.
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